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ABSTRACT
Small-area-variation studies have shown that physician treatment styles differ substantially both
between and within markets, controlling for patient characteristics. Using a data set containing the
universe of deliveries in Florida over a 12-year period with consistent physician identifiers and a rich
set of patient characteristics, we examine why treatment styles differ across obstetricians at a point
in time, and why styles change over time. We find that the variation in c-section rates across
physicians within a market is two to three times greater than the variation between markets.
Surprisingly, residency programs explain less than four percent of the variation between physicians
in their risk-adjusted c-section rates, even among newly-trained physicians. Although we find
evidence that physicians, especially relatively inexperienced ones, learn from their peers, they do not
substantially revise their prior beliefs regarding how patients should be treated due to the local
exchange of information. Our results indicate that physicians are not likely to converge over time
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1. Introduction 
There is an extensive literature demonstrating that people in the United States receive a 
substantially different amount and type of medical care depending on where they live (e.g., 
Wennberg and Gittelsohn, 1973; Wennberg, Freeman, and Culp, 1987; Wennberg, Fisher, and 
Skinner, 2002).  These studies usually compare the use rate of a particular treatment (e.g., back 
surgeries per capita) or medical expenditures across cities, counties, or states.  If there is a single 
treatment method that patients prefer, there will be welfare losses when the use rate diverges from 
the medically appropriate standard.
1  Phelps and Parente (1990) estimated an annual welfare loss 
in 1987 due to variations in hospital use rates of $33 billion.  
What matters to a consumer is whether the physician she chooses provides the 
appropriate treatment, not whether physicians in her market provide the appropriate treatment on 
average.  As Phelps and Parente (1990) point out, their $33 billion estimate will understate the 
true welfare loss if there is variation in use rates within a market (e.g., variation across physicians 
in their likelihood of admitting patients to a hospital) as well as between markets.  That is, even if 
the mean use rate of a market conforms to best medical practices, there will still be patients 
receiving too much or too little of the treatment if physicians in that market treat patients quite 
differently.   
A less frequently cited set of studies show that there is indeed considerable variation 
across physicians within a market in how they treat patients, controlling for patients’ observed 
health.  Stano and Folland (1988), for example, report that variation in the amount of medical 
                                                 
1 Use rates could vary across regions due to differences in prices, income, patients’ health status, patients’ 
preferences, or physicians’ ability or willingness to induce demand for their services.  Phelps (2000) 
concludes that these factors collectively explain very little of the differences in the amount of medical care 
received.  Several other authors concur with this assessment, including Chassin et al. (1986), Bikhchandani 
et al. (2001), and Newhouse (2002).   3 
care patients receive, measured by relative value units (RVUs),
2 is three to four times larger 
across physicians within a market as across markets.  Other studies find substantial variation 
across physicians in cesarean-section rates (Grant and McInnes, 2004; Goyert et al., 1989), RVUs 
per hospital admission (Welch, Miller, and Welch, 1994), hospitalization rates, hospital days, and 
length of hospital stays (Roos et al., 1986), total medical expenditures (Phelps, 2000), and 
medical expenditures on outpatient care (Grytten and Sorensen, 2003).  These results indicate that 
economists may be underestimating the welfare losses associated with variations in treatment 
styles, and the value to consumers of information on providers’ treatment styles.
3   
One concern with the latter set of studies, however, is that within-market variations will 
be overstated if patients’ unmeasured health differs across practices due to physician 
specialization or if the number of patients per physician is small and treatment styles are 
measured with error (Hofer et al., 1999).  Grant and McInnes (2004) and Roos et al. (1986) have 
detailed health information, but the other studies cited above use no or few risk adjusters.  Welch, 
Miller, and Welch (1994) and Roos et al. (1986) analyze all physicians with 10 or more and 15 or 
more admissions per year, respectively, which raises concerns about measurement error.  In a 
sample where each physician treated an average of 16 diabetic patients, Hofer et al. (1999) find 
that at least 96 percent of the variation across physicians in hospitalization and outpatient visit 
rates is due to unmeasured patient factors or chance, rather than physician practice styles.   
The first objective of this paper is to measure the amount of variation in treatment styles 
between obstetricians practicing in the same market.  Our primary measure of treatment style is 
the proportion of a physician’s deliveries performed by cesarean section, but we also examine 
elective c-section rates and c-section rates conditional on a woman going into labor.  We use 
                                                 
2 Relative value units are a way to aggregate heterogeneous services into a single measure.  Folland and 
Stano (1988) assigned a routine office visit a value of one, and every other service a value proportional to 
its charge relative to a routine office visit.  
3 If patients have preferences for different treatment styles and choose physicians accordingly, then some 
component of the within-market variation will enhance welfare.  Epstein, Ketcham, and Nicholson (2005)   4 
detailed information from hospital discharge abstracts to adjust a physician’s treatment style for 
patients’ health, a potentially important source of variation.  Moreover, the analysis is restricted 
to physicians who delivered 50 or more babies per year in order to measure treatment styles 
precisely.   
The choice of delivery method has implications for physicians, patients and payers.  With 
over 900,000 cesarean sections performed annually in the United States, c-sections are the second 
most common surgical procedure.  Women who received a c-section in Florida between 1992 and 
2003 remained in the hospital 3.6 days, on average, versus 2.1 days for women who had vaginal 
deliveries.  The average hospital charge for a c-section in Florida in the 1990s was $8,500, almost 
twice the charge for a vaginal delivery, while the average physician charge for a c-section is 
about $500 higher than for a vaginal delivery (Gruber, Kim, and Mayzlin, 1999).   
Our second objective is to examine the source and importance of physician learning.  
Specifically, we address whether residency programs exert a strong influence on physicians’ 
treatment styles, whether physicians learn from their immediate colleagues once they begin 
practicing, and whether learning leads to substantial changes in treatment styles over time.  
Phelps and Mooney (1993) propose a theoretical model to explain why treatment rates vary 
across markets and why a physician’s treatment style may change as he gains experience.  They 
argue that physicians form beliefs about the appropriateness and effectiveness of medical 
technologies during medical school and residency training.  When a physician begins practicing 
medicine, he observes how his colleagues treat patients and updates his prior belief about the 
appropriateness of a technology or treatment method.  The treatment styles of a physician’s peer 
group, therefore, serve as an inexpensive source of clinical information for continuing education.  
Phelps and Mooney theorize that physicians’ treatment styles will converge over time to a single 
community standard, but standards will differ across markets because residency programs 
                                                                                                                                                 
find that one-third of the within-market variation in cesarean section rates is due to patient-physician 
matching based on preferences.    5 
produce physicians with different beliefs, and graduates of residency programs locate unevenly 
across markets.
4  In the long run, therefore, this model predicts there will be inter-market 
variation in practice patterns but little intra-market variation across physicians.   
There have been few empirical tests of the Phelps and Mooney (1993) model, or even 
components of the model.  Roos et al. (1986) find that younger primary care physicians, 
physicians with a relatively small patient panel, and those trained in Manitoba are slightly more 
likely to hospitalize patients relative to other physicians practicing in Canada.  Grant and 
McInnes (2004) find that obstetricians who experience a large financial malpractice claim 
subsequently perform more c-sections and obstetricians who experience a small claim perform 
fewer c-sections, which indicate that physicians adjust their treatment styles as they learn from 
their interactions with the legal system.  The former study uses a cross-sectional data set and the 
latter study uses a two-year panel.  
Our data set contains the universe of hospital admissions in Florida over a 12-year period, 
and includes consistent physician identifiers and characteristics, such as information on where 
physicians trained.  We test whether residency programs produce physicians with distinct 
treatment styles, and whether those styles persist beyond the first few years of practice.  If so, 
then residency programs would be an effective means of promoting evidence-based medicine.  If 
a physician’s gender, race, experience and residency program explain a substantial amount of the 
variation in treatment styles, consumers can use those characteristics to reduce their cost of 
searching for a physician with their desired treatment style.   
The panel nature of the data allows us to explore whether a physician learns from his 
immediate peers, and whether learning is important relative to other market-specific forces, such 
as changes in reimbursement and the malpractice environment.  We construct two peer group 
variables -- the treatment style of physicians who deliver in the same hospital(s) as physician j 
                                                 
4 Banerjee (1992), Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995), and Bikhchandani, 
Hirschleifer, and Welch (1992) have also presented general models where individuals observe the decisions   6 
(the “local” peer group), and the treatment style of physicians who deliver in all other hospitals in 
physician j’s market (the “regional” peer group).  If both the local and regional peer groups are 
exposed to the same market policies and shocks, we can separately measure the influences of the 
local exchange of information and other regional factors.  If policies and shocks in fact differ 
within a small geographic market, our local peer variable will provide an upper bound on the 
effect of local learning.  
We find that the variation in c-section rates across physicians within a market is two to 
three times larger than the inter-market variation, controlling for observed patient characteristics.  
This implies that existing estimates of the welfare loss stemming from practice variation may be 
too low, and private health insurers and the government may be underestimating the value of 
standardizing treatment methods.  Treatment styles are not strongly shaped by residency training 
programs and are rather impervious to market-specific shocks and changes in peer treatment 
styles.  Residency programs explain less than four percent of the variation between physicians in 
c-section rates, even among physicians who have been practicing for fewer than four years.  Over 
30 percent of the variation in risk-adjusted c-section rates across physicians and years is due to 
time-invariant, physician-specific factors other than experience, gender, race, and where a 
physician received residency training.  Because we have detailed information on the 
characteristics of a physician’s patients, our interpretation is that a considerable amount of 
practice variation is due to idiosyncratic physician perceptions regarding the appropriateness of 
specific treatments. 
Although we find evidence that physicians, especially relatively inexperienced 
physicians, learn from their peers, they do not substantially revise their prior beliefs regarding 
how patients should be treated due to the local exchange of information.  A one-standard 
deviation increase in the risk-adjusted c-section rate of a local peer group is predicted to increase 
a new obstetrician’s risk-adjusted c-section rate by 6.0 percent, versus 3.0 percent for an 
                                                                                                                                                 
of their peers, update their priors, and rationally decide to herd on the choices of their peers.   7 
obstetrician with 16 years of experience.  Our results imply that physicians are not likely to 
converge over time to a community standard, thereby eliminating the within-market variation in 
treatment styles.  
In the next section we present the conceptual framework for the paper and some 
descriptive data on c-section rates in Florida between 1992 and 2003.  We describe the data and 
methods in Section 3; Section 4 contains our estimation results; and we conclude in Section 5. 
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
Our primary measure of a physician’s treatment style is the proportion of deliveries he 
performs by cesarean section, controlling for patients’ observed characteristics or risk.  This 
proportion, Y, can be decomposed into the proportion of patients who go into labor (￿) multiplied 
by the obstetrician’s c-section rate conditional on labor (Y￿), plus the proportion of patients who 
do not go into labor but are instead scheduled to receive a c-section (1-￿):   
(1)  Y = ￿Y￿ + (1 – ￿) 
For each physician we separately measure the overall c-section rate (Y), the proportion of 
patients receiving a c-section without laboring (1-￿), and the c-section rate conditional on labor 
(Y￿), and we adjust all three treatment style measures based on each patient’s observed risk 
characteristics. 
The overall, unadjusted c-section rate in Florida changed markedly during our 1992 to 
2003 sample period.  The c-section rate in Florida fell from 25.7 percent in 1992 to 22.8 percent 
in 1996, as displayed in Figure 1. During this period slightly fewer c-sections were scheduled (the 
percentage of deliveries where the mother went into labor is reported at the bottom of Figure 1), 
and the c-section rate among women who went into labor was also declining.  The c-section rate 
has increased steadily since 1996, reaching 33.1 percent in 2003.  The rise in the c-section rate 
was driven primarily by a doubling of the elective (or scheduled) c-section rate, from 10.9 percent 
in 1996 to 23.3 percent of all deliveries in 2003.    8 
C-sections are not a new technology, so one might expect information regarding the 
medically appropriate use of this treatment to have diffused widely, resulting in near uniformity 
of the c-section rate across regions.  However, as with most medical treatments, there is 
considerable regional variation in the proportion of deliveries performed by c-section.  In Table 1 
we report the mean c-section rate in the 11 Florida health districts in 2003, adjusted for patient 
health characteristics and health insurance status.  The c-section rate ranges from 18.8 percent to 
27.3 percent, and regions with a high overall c-section rate tend to have both a relatively high 
scheduled c-section rate and a relatively high c-section rate conditional on a woman going into 
labor. 
Chetty (1998) develops a theoretical model of the decision to use c-section versus vaginal 
delivery in which some women (and/or their babies) will have better outcomes with a vaginal 
delivery and others with a c-section.  Physicians choose a risk threshold such that women with 
values below this threshold receive a vaginal delivery, and women with values above this 
threshold receive a c-section. Because physicians estimate a woman’s true risk with error, some 
c-sections will be performed when a vaginal delivery would have produced a better outcome, ex 
post, and vice versa with some vaginal deliveries.  If physicians were perfect agents, they would 
choose a risk threshold such that the expected cost to the patient of a c-section when, ex post, a 
vaginal delivery would have produced a superior outcome, is equal to the expected cost of a 
vaginal delivery when a c-section would have produced a superior outcome.   
Phelps and Mooney (1993) propose that physicians form beliefs about the 
appropriateness and effectiveness of medical technologies during medical school and residency 
training, similar to the views expressed by Wennberg and Gittelsohn (1973), Wennberg (1985), 
and Stano (1993).  In our context, variation in the c-section within a region will occur if 
physicians choose different risk thresholds, controlling for observed patient characteristics, either 
due to information they acquired during their formal medical education or due to their 
idiosyncratic views.  Physicians who attach a high cost to performing a vaginal delivery when a   9 
c-section was merited, ex post, will choose a low risk threshold and will have a high c-section 
rate, while physicians who attach a high cost to performing a c-section when a vaginal deliver 
was merited will choose a high threshold and will have a low rate.     
If residency programs produce physicians with distinctive treatment styles and graduates 
locate unevenly across markets, then treatment styles will also vary between regions.  Phelps and 
Mooney (1993) hypothesize that physicians will update their prior beliefs regarding the 
appropriateness of a technology or treatment method based on how their colleagues treat similar 
patients.  If this form of local learning has a strong effect, physicians’ treatment styles would 
converge over time to a single regional standard.  
Over the last decade, economists have examined whether peer groups affect peoples’ 
behavior in a wide variety of settings.
5  To the best of our knowledge, however, there has been 
only one empirical study of whether a physician’s treatment style is influenced by the treatment 
style of his immediate colleagues and, if so, how important this phenomenon is relative to other 
factors that may influence treatment decisions.  Escarce (1996) finds that once a general surgeon 
began performing laparoscopic cholecystectomies, it promoted early adoption among other 
surgeons at the same hospital.  If peer effects are strong, the diffusion of a public policy that 
promotes a particular treatment method will accelerate as the number of physicians adopting that 
treatment increases.  One explanation for the paucity of these studies is the difficulty of 
separating the causal effect of the peer group from unobserved factors, market forces, and market 
policies that affect both a physician and his peer group (Manski, 1993).   
 
3. Methods and Data 
 
                                                 
5 For example, recent studies measure the influence of peers on a teenagers’ criminal behavior (Glaeser, 
Sacerdote, and Scheinkman, 1996), the likelihood that teenagers will complete high school and become 
pregnant (Evans, Oates, and Schwab, 1996), and high school students’ use of cigarettes, alcohol, and drugs 
(Gaviria and Raphael, 2001).     10 
3.1. Data 
We construct our sample from the 1992-2003 Florida hospital discharge data sets, which 
contain information on 2.2 million deliveries that occurred at all non-federal, short-term acute 
care hospitals in Florida.  We observe the mother’s demographic information (age, race, 
ethnicity), her insurance coverage (e.g., HMO), codes for the primary diagnosis and secondary 
diagnoses, procedure codes that specify whether the baby was delivered vaginally or via c-
section, a unique and consistent (across hospitals and years) physician identifier, a unique and 
consistent hospital identifier, and the quarter and year the patient was discharged.  Sample means 
and standard deviations for the patient-level data set are reported in Table 2.   
The diagnoses codes allow us to control for objective health conditions that affect the 
probability a physician will perform a c-section (e.g., whether a woman has had a c-section prior 
to this delivery, whether the fetus was malpositioned during the delivery such as in the breech 
position, or whether the labor occurred before the fetus was full-term).
6  We use a method 
developed by Henry et al. (1995) and Gregory et al. (2002) to determine whether a woman went 
into labor.  Women who delivered vaginally or had diagnoses codes indicating fetal distress, labor 
abnormalities, cord prolapse, or a breech converted to vertex presentation were interpreted as 
having gone into labor; all other women were coded as having a scheduled c-section. 
Because the data contain all hospital discharges with consistent physician identifiers, we 
are able to examine a physician’s entire inpatient practice over time.  We link the physician 
license numbers to data from the American Medical Association’s (AMA) Masterfile to collect 
information on each physician’s gender and race, the residency program(s) where he received 
training, and the year he completed residency training.  We use the latter information to create a 
variable for years of post-residency experience.  We also have information on race for a subset of 
physicians from the Florida State Medical Board.  
                                                 
6 Two diagnoses that are frequently associated with a c-section, fetal distress and abnormal labor, are fairly 
subjective, so we do not include these as control variables.   11 
We include all physicians when constructing peer group averages, but omit from the 
subsequent analyses physicians who delivered fewer than 50 babies in any year in which they 
practiced in Florida.  Omitting small-volume physicians should increase the precision of the 
practice style measures.  
 
3.2 Measuring Physicians’ Treatment Styles 
We would like our measures of treatment style to characterize how each physician would 
treat the same set of patients.  Absent a randomized design, we develop risk-adjusted treatment 
styles that control for differences across physicians in the observed characteristics of their 
patients.  For each physician in each year of practice, we separately measure the overall c-section 
rate, elective c-section rate, and c-section rate conditional on labor.  
To derive a physician’s overall risk-adjusted c-section rate, for example, we estimate the 
following linear probability model, separately for each year between 1992 and 2003: 
(2)  Cij =  a a a aXi + YJ + eij 
Cij equals one if patient i received a c-section by physician j and is zero otherwise.  We include 
patient characteristics X, such as the patient’s age, type of health insurance, existing medical 
conditions (e.g., severe hypertension), and the status of the pregnancy (e.g., multiple gestation, 
preterm gestation, antepartum bleeding, whether the woman had a c-section in a prior delivery) 
that may affect the risks and/or benefits of a c-section.  We also include a full set of physician 
indicator variables J and do not include a constant.  The coefficients on the physician indicators 
(Y) measure the probability that a particular physician will perform a c-section, controlling for 
observed characteristics of the mother’s health and the status of the pregnancy.
7  In Table 3 we 
present selected coefficient estimates from the ordinary least squares estimation for 2003. 
                                                 
7 We estimate equation (2) with ordinary least squares rather than a probit or logit model for expediency 
and because the coefficients on the physician indicators are easier to interpret with OLS.  Our results are 
robust to using an alternative model.  In 2003, for example, there is a correlation of 0.95 between the 
coefficients on the physician indicator variables from an OLS and a logit regression.   12 
Although the primary purpose of this regression is to recover the coefficients on the 
physician indicator variables (Y), the coefficients on the patient characteristics (a a a a) are interesting 
nonetheless.  Although each health condition we include is present in fewer than three percent of 
women, most conditions substantially increase the chance a woman will have a c-section.  Each 
coefficient can be interpreted as the average change in a patient’s probability of receiving a c-
section associated with a change in the independent variable.  For example, a woman with severe 
hypertension has a probability of receiving a c-section that is 21 percentage points higher than 
women without that condition.  A woman who had a prior c-section has a 67 percentage point 
higher probability of having a c-section on her current delivery relative to a woman who has not 
had a c-section before, and a woman with a malpositioned fetus is also much more highly to have 
a c-section than a woman whose fetus is in the vertex position.  Hispanic women are slightly 
more likely to receive a c-section than white women, and women who have Medicaid and 
uninsured women are less likely to receive a c-section than women who have indemnity insurance 
or a PPO plan.  Medicaid generally reimburses physicians and hospitals less than private insurers, 
so our result is consistent with Gruber, Kim, and Mayzlin’s (1999) finding that higher fee 
differentials between c-sections and normal deliveries lead to higher c-section rates.   
We perform similar regressions to derive a physician’s risk-adjusted elective c-section 
rate and risk-adjusted c-section rate conditional on labor.  The latter regression is estimated only 
on women who went into labor, and the dependent variable is one if she received a c-section and 
zero if she delivered vaginally.
8  After we run a separate regression like the one reported in Table 
3 for each of the 12 years and each of the three practice style measures, we recover the physician 
coefficients and create a panel data set where observations are at the level of physician j’s 
practice style for year t.   
One concern is that the practice style measures may be noisy, imprecise estimates of a 
physician’s true style.  This could occur if the component of patient health that physicians   13 
observe and we do not has a substantial effect on treatment decisions, and the mean unobserved 
health of a physician’s patient population changes substantially from year to year due, in part, to 
small patient volume.  Limiting the sample to patients of physicians who perform deliveries 50 or 
more times per year should reduce the possibility of spurious treatment style measures.  We find 
that the correlation between a physician’s treatment style in year t and year t -1 is high, ranging 
from 0.65 for the c-section rate conditional on labor to 0.76 for the overall c-section rate.   
Kane and Staiger (2002) develop a test to measure how much of the change in school test 
scores is due to non-persistent variation, such as high teacher-turnover in a school during a 
particular year, the chemistry between a teacher and her students, or test-taking conditions.  If the 
correlation of the change in test scores in adjacent years is negative and large (i.e., a class that 
experienced a large increase from year 1 to year 2 tends to have a large decrease in scores from 
year 2 to year 3), most of the change is transitory; when the correlation is close to zero, most of 
the change is persistent and the scores are an accurate measure of performance.
9  When we apply 
this test, the proportion of the changes in physician treatment styles that are attributable to 
persistent factors ranges from 0.25 for the elective c-section rate, to 0.58 for the overall c-section 
rate.   
 
3.3 Defining Local and Regional Peer Groups 
We divide Florida into 11 health care markets using the Florida Department of Health’s definition 
of local health districts, which consist of one or more contiguous counties.  These markets are 
large enough so that 93 percent of the deliveries occur at a hospital in the same market where the 
mother resides.  For each physician we construct a measure of the practice style of his local and 
regional peers.  We define physician j’s local peer group in year t as all physicians other than 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 Results from these regressions are available from the authors by request. 
9 Specifically, the proportion of the change in the performance measure that is due to non-persistent factors 
is equal to -2 multiplied by the correlation of the change in adjacent years (Kane and Staiger, (2002).  This 
test assumes that the permanent and transitory shocks in adjacent years are independent.   14 
physician j who delivered a baby at the same hospital(s) as physician j in year t.
10  Physician j’s 
regional peer group in year t includes all physicians who delivered a baby at a hospital in the 
same market as physician j other than the hospital(s) where physician j delivered.
11  We use the 
physician-specific practice style coefficients for the members of physician j’s local and regional 
peer groups to create delivery-weighted local and regional peer group treatment styles for each 
physician for each year, where the weight is the proportion of the total quantity of deliveries 
performed by the group (other than physician j) accounted for by each physician (other than 
physician j).  
A physician is more likely to exchange clinical information with his local than his 
regional peers, but is likely to be affected by the same market-specific policies as his regional 
peers.  We use this assumption to try to separate the influence of the local exchange of clinical 
information from policies that affect all physicians in a market.  Sixty percent of the physicians in 
our data set delivered all their babies at a single hospital, 27 percent divided their deliveries 
between two hospitals, and 13 percent at three or more hospitals.  The mean number of physicians 
in a local peer group is 20 and in a regional peer group is 67.   
We present the means and standard deviations of the variables in the physician-year-level 
data set in Table 4.  This data set contains 848 physicians representing 7,004 physician-years.  
Fourteen percent of the physicians are women and 85 percent are obstetricians/gynecologists.   
They have 13 years of post-residency experience and delivered 191 babies per year, on average.   
 
3.4 Empirical Model 
                                                 
10 We pooled the experience of individual physicians with fewer than 50 deliveries in a year in hospital-
specific residual groups and included these residuals in the peer group calculations. 
11 A physician who delivers in both a hospital where physician j delivers as well as a hospital in the same 
region where physician j does not deliver will appear in both physician j’s local and regional peer groups.  
Although this will not bias our empirical estimates, it will make it more difficult to measure the separate 
effects of regional policies and of the local exchange of information.  Fortunately, a majority of physicians 
in our sample deliver at a single hospital.     15 
The first objective of this paper is to measure the amount of variation in treatment styles 
among obstetricians practicing in the same market.  We argued above that a patient who is 
searching for a physician will care more about the variation in treatment styles among physicians 
within a market than across markets or regions.  Our second objective is to examine why 
treatment styles differ between physicians.  Our third objective is to determine whether 
physicians learn from their immediate colleagues and if this local learning leads to substantial 
changes in treatment styles over time.  
In order to quantify the variation that exists between physicians within a market, we 
calculate the difference between a physician’s treatment style (Yjt, as estimated in equation (2)) 
and the mean treatment style for the physician’s market in year t.
12  We then calculate the 
standard deviations of the within-market practice style measures for the overall risk-adjusted c-
section rate, the risk-adjusted elective c-section rate, and the risk-adjusted c-section rate 
conditional on labor, and compare these to the between-market standard deviation. 
For purposes of estimating the determinants of variation in physician treatment styles, 
each observation is a practice style measure for a physician-year.  We pool the observations 
across the 12 years and 848 physicians and estimate a series of OLS regressions.  We first regress 
the Yjt on a full set of physician and year indicator variables.  The R
2 from this regression 
represents the total amount of variation that can be explained by physician-specific and year-
specific factors.   
We use the incremental R
2 method proposed by Theil (1971) to decompose the total 
explained variation into incremental components that can be attributed to the year, region, 
physician characteristics, location of residency training, and all other unmeasured factors specific 
to a physician.  To do this, we repeat the regression described above after replacing the physician 
indicator variables with indicator variables for a physician’s gender, race, specialty, obstetrical   16 
residency program, region, a continuous variable measuring years of post-residency experience, 
and experience squared.  We include indicator variables for the 15 residency programs that 
trained five or more physicians in our sample.  The difference in the R
2 between the first and 
second regressions is the amount of variation due to time-invariant, physician-specific factors 
other than those we explicitly control for in the second regression (i.e., gender, race, specialty, 
location of training, and experience). 
In order to measure the amount of variation explained by time, we remove the year 
indicator variables from the second regression, and measure the difference in the R
2 between the 
second and third regressions.  After restoring the year indicators, we then successively omit from 
the second regression specification the region indicators, the physician characteristics, and the 
residency program indicators, and measure an incremental R
2 for each factor.    
Our third objective is to examine whether physicians change their treatment styles based 
on clinical information acquired from peers.  Manski (1993) notes that one of the major 
challenges of empirically estimating social interactions is to measure separately the effect on an 
individual’s behavior of his peer group’s behavior (in our context the treatment style of a 
physician’s peers), unobserved characteristics shared by members of a peer group (e.g., technical 
skill or risk aversion), and the environment in which the members of a peer group operate (e.g., 
reimbursement incentives and the probability of being sued for malpractice).   
In an ordinary least squares regression of a physician’s treatment style on the style of his 
peer group, the coefficient on the latter variable would capture the net effect of all three factors.  
We address this problem by estimating fixed-effects models to control for unobserved 
characteristics that a physician may share in common with his peer group, and including two non-
overlapping peer group variables rather than a single peer variable.  Specifically, we perform a 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 We derive the market risk-adjusted c-section rate by replacing the physician indicator variables in 
equation (2) with a complete set of 11 indicators for the Florida local health districts.  The coefficient on a 
market indicator variable is the risk-adjusted c-section rate for that market in that year.   17 
series of fixed-effect regressions where the dependent variable is physician j’s treatment style in 
year t (Yjt) and the complete specification has the following form: 
(3)  Yjt = g0+ g1Ljt + g2Rjt + g3Lj,t-1 + g4Rj,t-1 + g g g g5T + mj + vjt    
T is a set of year indicators that will capture the trend in how babies were delivered in Florida 
over the 1992 to 2003 time period, including the effect of state policies and changes in national 
clinical guidelines.
13  Ljt is the contemporaneous treatment style in year t for physician j’s local 
peer group (physicians who perform deliveries at the same hospital(s) as physician j) and Rjt is 
the treatment style of physician j’s regional peer group (physicians in j’s market who deliver 
babies at hospitals other than those where physician j delivers babies).  The coefficient g1 
measures the change in physician j’s treatment style associated with a change in the treatment 
style of his local peer group, and likewise for g2 with respect to his regional peer group. 
A physician may be more likely to join a practice or locate in a market populated with 
physicians who share a personal characteristic that we do not observe, such as technical skill.  In 
a fixed-effects model, the coefficients g1 and g2 are identified by variations over time in the 
practice style of a physician’s peers.  Any unobserved characteristic that is time invariant, such as 
the technical skill of a physician and his peers, will drop out.  In an ordinary least squares 
regression, g1 and g2 would be biased upward.   
If one includes a single peer group variable in equation (3), the coefficient would capture 
the causal effect of both changes in the practice style of a physician’s peers on changes in his own 
practice style, and the effect of policies and shocks (e.g., changes in patients’ preferences or 
changes in private health insurance reimbursement incentives) on changes in the treatment styles 
of all physicians in the same market.  We try to separately measure these two effects by including 
both the local (Ljt) and regional (Rjt) peer group measures.  Consider a situation where members 
                                                 
13 In 2000, for example, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists proposed a c-section 
benchmark of 15.5 percent women at 37 weeks of gestation or greater, having their first child, with a single   18 
of a physician’s local and regional peer groups are exposed to the same policies and shocks.  
When physicians with distinctive treatment styles enter or exit a local peer group, Lj will change 
differently between t-1 and t than Rj.  The coefficient g2 will capture the impact of market-level 
policies and shocks on a physician’s treatment style, and the coefficient g1 will capture the 
incremental, causal effect of a change in the local peer group’s treatment style on physician j’s 
treatment style.
14   
Under this set of assumptions, g1 provides an upper-bound estimate of the effect of new 
clinical information on a physician’s treatment decisions.  If there are policies and shocks that 
affect a physician’s local peers differently than his regional peers, such as a change in patient 
preferences by a subset of the patients in a market, a change in reimbursement incentives for a 
single physician group practice, or a clinical policy initiated by a single hospital, then g1 will 
overstate the amount of learning due solely to the exchange of clinical information.  Even in this 
case, however, comparing the magnitudes of g1 and g2 will still illuminate the importance of local 
versus regional factors in determining treatment decisions.   
We would like to identify g1 and g2 with exogenous changes in the composition of a 
physician’s peer group due to retirement, relocation, and the arrival of newly-trained physicians.  
There was considerable turnover of obstetricians in Florida over the sample period.  Between 
1993 and 2003, an average of 18.8 obstetricians exited the sample each year because they stopped 
practicing, stopped delivering babies, or moved out of Florida, and 19.3 obstetricians entered the 
sample per year.   Our identifying assumption is that changes in the practice style of a physician’s 
peer group are exogenous with respect to expected changes in the physician’s practice style and 
policies that are expected to affect the physician’s practice style.     
                                                                                                                                                 
fetus in the vertex (non-breech) position (American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 2000).  
The report contained a number of specific recommendations to help obstetricians meet this goal. 
14 Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2003) use a similar method.  They allow the stock-holding decisions of a mutual 
fund manager to be affected differently by the decisions of other managers in the same geographic market 
and managers in more remote geographic markets.   19 
The estimated practice style for each physician will capture differences between 
physicians in their perceptions of the appropriateness of c-sections, and differences across 
physicians in unobserved (by us) patient characteristics.  For this analysis we are interested only 
in the former component.  Women with strong preferences for having a c-section and women 
with unobserved health characteristics that increase the benefits of a c-section may select 
particular physicians who specialize in the procedure.
15  Another benefit of using a fixed-effects 
model is that the component of Yj that is due to unobserved, time-invariant patient characteristics 
(mj) will be eliminated.    
In order to examine how quickly physicians respond to new information, in one 
specification we add lagged measures of the treatment styles of a physician’s regional and local 
peer groups, Rj,t-1 and Lj,t-1.  Our hypothesis is that physicians will incorporate new information 
obtained from local sources more quickly than regional sources, because physicians interact more 
regularly and more intensively with their local peers than their regional peers.  A significant g4 
coefficient and an insignificant g3 coefficient would be consistent with this hypothesis.  In the 
final specification we interact the peer group practice style variables with a physician’s 
experience to see if younger physicians are influenced more strongly than older physicians, which 
would be consistent with the Bayesian learning model in Phelps and Mooney (1993). 
The dependent variables in the second stage (equation 3), Yjt, are themselves estimated 
from the first stage, patient-level regressions (equation 2).  To increase efficiency, we would like 
to weight the second stage regressions with the inverse of the standard errors of Yjt from the first 
stage.
16  Weighting in this manner places greater emphasis high-volume physicians who have 
more precisely estimated treatment style coefficients. Because we are unable use weights with a 
                                                 
15 Most obstetricians are members of a group practice, and it is common for a single obstetrician in a group 
to perform all of the practice’s deliveries between, say, 5pm and 7am the following day.  Many women, 
therefore, choose their preferred obstetrics practice but not the actual physician who will deliver her child.  
The randomness of many patient-physician matches will reduce the component of Yj that is due to 
unmeasured patient characteristics.   
16 Grant and McInnes (2004) and Shen (2003) use the same method.   20 
fixed effects model, we also estimate first-difference versions of equation (3) where we use the 
inverse of the first-stage standard errors as weights.  The results from the first-difference 
regressions are very similar to those from the fixed effects model, as discussed below.  
 
4. Results 
Phelps and Parente (1990) estimate there is an annual welfare loss of $33 billion (in 1987 
dollars) due to practice variations, based on variations in treatment rates between New York 
counties.  The true welfare loss will be higher if physician treatment styles vary within a market.  
To estimate the amount of within-market variation, we calculate the difference between each 
physician’s treatment style and the market average for year t.  We pool these observations over 
the 1992 to 2003 time period and depict the distribution separately for the three treatment styles 
in Figure 2.  In 30 percent of the cases the physician’s risk-adjusted c-section rate in the first 
panel of Figure 2 is statistically different from the regional mean at the five percent level.
17  The 
standard deviation of the within-market variation in risk-adjusted c-section rates is 6.0 percentage 
points, more than twice the variation across regions at a point in time (reported at the bottom of 
Table 1).  The within-market variations for the elective c-section rate and c-section rate 
conditional on labor are also two to three times larger than the between-market variation.  Two 
identical women who live in the same market and choose their obstetricians randomly are likely 
to have very different ex ante probabilities of receiving a c-section.  Thus health insurers and the 
government may be substantially underestimating the benefit of standardizing physicians’ 
treatment methods.   
One concern is that measurement error may exaggerate the amount of variation that 
actually exists between physicians in their treatment styles.  When we apply a Bayesian shrinkage 
technique (Hofer et al., 1999) to account for each physician’s signal-to-noise ratio, the within-
                                                 
17 This is similar to the result in Phelps (2000) where one-third of the primary care physicians have mean 
expenditures per patient that differ from the market average.    21 
market variation for 1992 is reduced by 19 percent (the standard deviation decreases from 6.5 to 
5.3 percentage points).  Our results, therefore, are not an artifact of measurement error. 
We decompose the total explained variation in treatment styles into incremental 
components that can be attributed to the year, region, physician characteristics, location of 
residency training, and all other unmeasured factors specific to a physician.  We separately 
examine all physicians and inexperienced physicians – those with fewer than 4 years of post-
residency experience – to test whether the impacts of residency training and physician 
characteristics diminish over a physician’s career.  Results are reported in Table 5.  The year 
indicators explain 20 to 30 percent of the variation in treatment styles of experienced physicians, 
whereas the regional indicators account for three to six percent.  Physician characteristics and the 
15 residency program indicators explain very little of the variation.  Apparently residency 
programs do not produce obstetricians with distinct views regarding how patients should be 
treated, or these differences dissipate quickly once physicians begin practicing.
18   
Over 30 percent of the variation in treatment styles among experienced physicians is due 
to time-invariant, physician-specific factors that are not associated with where a physician 
trained, his experience, gender, or race.  Because we have detailed information on patient 
characteristics, our interpretation is that a considerable amount of practice variation is due to 
idiosyncratic physician perceptions regarding how patients should be treated.  Grytten and 
Sorensen (2003) find that physician-specific effects explain slightly more than half of the 
variation in average medical spending per patient among primary care physicians in Norway.  
However, they have a much more limited set of risk adjusters (the gender mix and average age of 
a physician’s patients only), so there is likely to be more unobserved patient heterogeneity across 
practices in their sample than in ours. 
                                                 
18 An alternative explanation is that the time-invariant coding of residency programs misses important 
variation over time in the styles that residency programs impart to their trainees.   22 
The results for physicians with fewer than four years of post-residency experience are 
reported in the final three columns of Table 5.  Relative to the all-physician analysis, less of the 
variation in treatment styles among inexperienced physicians is attributed to time and more is 
attributed to physician characteristics and location of training.  Nevertheless, residency programs 
still explain less than four percent of the variation. We expected residency programs to have a 
relatively strong effect on the practice styles of newly trained physicians, before they fully 
incorporated the practice styles of their peers and the health outcomes of their own patients into 
treatment decisions.   
In Tables 6-8 we examine whether and why physician treatment styles change over time.  
In the fixed effects specification reported in column 1 we include the contemporaneous treatment 
style of physician j’s regional peer group, Rjt – the physicians in j’s market who deliver babies at 
hospitals other than those where physician j delivers babies—and year indicators.  The coefficient 
on Rjt, which is identified by within-market variations in regional peer groups’ treatment styles 
over time, is positive and significant.  A one percentage point increase in the c-section rate of a 
physician’s regional peer group relative to the state average is associated with a 0.14 percentage 
point increase in the physician’s own c-section rate.  Although physicians’ treatment styles 
generally move together, the correlation between individual physicians is relatively low.  This is 
consistent with our results in Table 5 that a considerable amount of the variation between 
physicians in their treatment styles is due to differences in their perceptions regarding treatment 
efficacy and appropriateness.  
In the second column of Table 6 we include the risk-adjusted c-section rate of a 
physician’s local peers.  A one percentage point increase in the overall c-section rate of a 
physician’s immediate colleagues is associated with an increase of 0.046 percentage points in his 
own rate.  As discussed above, this coefficient is an upper-bound estimate of the effect of new 
clinical information on a physician’s treatment decisions.  The local exchange of information has 
a statistically significant but rather small effect on obstetricians’ treatment styles.  A one-standard   23 
deviation (10.9 percentage points) increase in a physician’s local peer rate is associated with a 
0.50 percentage point (or 3.5 percent) increase in his own rate.   
Although the coefficient on the regional peer group decreases when the local peer 
variable is included, it is twice as large as the coefficient on the local peer group.  Market policies 
and shocks appear to have a more substantial effect on physicians’ treatment decisions than does 
the local exchange of information.  However, both of these effects are small.  Consider an 
obstetrician whose risk-adjusted c-section rate is at the 90
th percentile in Florida for 2003.  If the 
c-section rates of his regional and local peer groups both decrease by one standard deviation, his 
c-section rate is predicted to decrease by 1.1 percentage points, which would now place him at the 
88
th percentile.   
We include the lagged regional and local peer group treatment styles in column 3 of 
Table 6.
19  For the regional peer group variables, the contemporaneous coefficient is insignificant 
and the lagged coefficient is significant, whereas for the local peer group variables the opposite 
pattern holds.  This suggests that, as expected, physicians take a longer time to respond to a 
market policy/shock than to a change in the local information set.  In the final specification in 
column 4 we interact each of the two peer group variables with a physician’s years of post-
residency experience.  The impact of a market shock/policy does not differ according to a 
physician’s experience, whereas a change in the treatment style of a local peer group has a 
relatively strong effect on inexperienced physicians.   A one-standard deviation increase in the 
risk-adjusted c-section rate of a local peer group is predicted to increase a new obstetrician’s risk-
adjusted c-section rate by 6.0 percent, versus 3.0 percent for an obstetrician with 16 years of 
experience. 
In Table 7 we present fixed effect coefficient estimates from a regression in which the 
dependent variable is a physician’s risk-adjusted elective c-section rate – the proportion of 
deliveries that are c-sections and the woman does not go into labor.  As with the overall risk-  24 
adjusted c-section rate, both the regional and local peer group coefficients are positive and 
significant in column 2, and the regional effect is twice as large as the local effect.  The two peer 
group coefficients are about twice as large in magnitude as in Table 6, which indicates that 
market and local shocks have a particularly strong effect on elective c-sections.  Recall from 
Figure 1 that the pronounced increase in Florida’s c-section rate since 1997 has been driven 
largely by an increase in the proportion of deliveries that are elective, scheduled c-sections.  A 
one-standard deviation increase in the elective c-section rate of a physician’s market and local 
peers are each predicted to increase his rate by 0.6 percentage points (from 4.7 percentage points 
to 5.3 percentage points), or 12 percent.  The coefficients on the lagged regional and lagged local 
peer group treatment styles are both significant in column 3, which indicates that it takes time for 
regional and local shocks to affect a physician’s elective c-section rate. 
In Table 8 we report coefficient estimates for a physician’s risk-adjusted c-section rate 
conditional on a woman going into labor.  The pattern of coefficients is generally similar to those 
in Table 6 and Table 7, although physician treatment styles are less responsive to market and 
local shocks.  As before, physicians respond more quickly to changes in their local information 
set than to market policies/shocks, and inexperienced physicians are influenced more 
substantially than experienced physicians. 
  We also estimate first-difference versions of equation (3) where we weight the 
observations with the multiplicative inverse of the first-stage standard errors.  This places a 
greater weight on high-volume physicians, who have more precisely estimated treatment style 
coefficients.  In Table 9 we report coefficient estimates for the first-difference specification that 
includes the contemporaneous and lagged measures of the two peer group variables.  The results 
are generally consistent with the fixed effect model results in column 3, although the coefficients 
are not as precisely estimated.  Of particular interest, in all three regressions the coefficients on 
the change from t-1 to t in a local peer group’s practice style (0.041, 0.087, and 0.036) are very 
                                                                                                                                                 
19 Note that the sample size diminishes by over 800 observations when we include the lagged variables.   25 
close to the fixed effect coefficients on the contemporaneous local practice style from column 3 
of Tables 6-8 (0.044, 0.10, and 0.037).  This provides evidence that the results are robust when 
we account for the fact that the dependent variables are themselves estimates.  
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we investigate how obstetricians form their treatment styles, and whether 
and how much their styles evolve over time.  We assemble a comprehensive data set that contains 
the universe of inpatient births in Florida over a 12-year period matched with detailed information 
on the physicians performing the deliveries.  Because the data contain consistent physician 
identifiers, we are able to examine physicians’ treatment decisions over an extended time period.  
We construct annual measures of each physician’s propensity to provide cesarean section that 
control for a range of patient health and demographic characteristics.  We then examine the 
influence of physician-level attributes on practice styles, focusing on the role of residency 
training, learning from peers, and market factors.  To isolate the effect of peer groups from 
market factors, we explore the relative contributions of other physicians practicing at the same 
hospitals as a given physician (the “local” peer group) as well as physicians practicing at different 
hospitals in the same market (the “regional” peer group). 
As with most medical care treatments, differences in the mean c-section rates between the 
11 regions of Florida, controlling for patients’ observed characteristics, are quite large.  In 2003, 
for example, the risk-adjusted probability a woman would have a cesarean section ranged from a 
low of 0.188 in Northwest Florida to a high of 0.273 in Miami.  We show that there are even 
larger differences in c-section rates among physicians within a region; the standard deviation of 
the c-section rate across physicians within a region is more than twice as large as the between-
region variation, controlling for observed patient characteristics.  This implies that existing 
estimates of the welfare loss stemming from practice variation are too low, and payers may be 
underestimating the value of standardizing treatment methods.   26 
Physician demographic factors and training experiences appear to have a small effect on 
inter-physician variation in the type of medical care received.  Less than 1 percent of the variation 
in c-section rates among all physicians can be explained by where they trained as a resident. 
Likewise, a physician’s experience, gender, and race account for around 2 percent of the variation 
in c-section rates.    Over 30 percent of the variation in risk-adjusted c-section rates among all 
physicians is due to time-invariant, physician-specific factors other than experience, gender, race, 
and where a physician received residency training. The explanatory power of these factors is 
somewhat higher among new physicians. Because we have detailed information on the 
characteristics of a physician’s patients, our interpretation is that a considerable amount of 
practice variation is due to idiosyncratic physician styles.   
The importance of the exchange of information with a local peer group and market-wide 
policy shocks is similarly muted.  A one percentage point increase in the overall c-section rate of 
a physician’s local peer group yields a 0.046 percentage point increase in his own rate, roughly 
half the 0.11 percentage point increase associated with a one percentage point increase in the 
regional peer group’s overall c-section rate.  These relationships hold more or less for the elective 
c-section rate and the c-section rate conditional on maternal labor as well. 
  Physicians appear to be quite independent.  Treatment styles are not strongly shaped by 
residency training programs and are rather impervious to market-specific shocks and changes in 
peer treatment styles.  Although physicians learn from their peers, especially relatively 
inexperienced physicians, they do not substantially revise their prior beliefs regarding how 
patients should be treated due to the local exchange of information.  Our finding in Table 5, 
however, that the year variables explain a considerable amount of the variation indicates that 
national forces, such as a change in clinical guidelines and changes in patient preferences, do 
have a strong influence on treatment styles.  Taken together, these results imply that cross-
sectional variations in regional treatment rates that are commonly observed are unlikely to 
dissipate substantially over time, nor is the within-market variation across physicians likely to   27 
dissipate over time due to convergence to a community standard.  This is in contrast to the 
predictions of Phelps and Mooney (1993), who postulate that in the long run there will be inter-
market variation in practice patterns but little intra-market variation across physicians.     28 
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Table 1: Variation in Obstetrical Treatment Styles Between Florida Regions, 2003 
 
              Risk-adjusted            Risk-adjusted 
Florida local    Risk-adjusted         scheduled            c-section rate 
health district    c-section rate       c-section rate       conditional on labor 
 
      1          0.188      0.068        0.152 
      4          0.192      0.072        0.150 
      7          0.204      0.084        0.151 
      3          0.205      0.080        0.159 
      6          0.217      0.081        0.169 
      2          0.217      0.090        0.167 
      8          0.220      0.086        0.171 
      5          0.229      0.090        0.175 
      9          0.231      0.102        0.170 
    10          0.258      0.114        0.190 
    11          0.273      0.118        0.209 
 
   Mean         0.221      0.090        0.169     
 
   Standard deviation      0.026      0.016        0.018 
 
   Coefficient of       0.12      0.18        0.11 




Note: a region is defined as one of the 11 local health districts in Florida.  We use variables 
displayed in Table 2 to adjust the probability a patient receives a c-section for her health, the 
status of the pregnancy, and type of insurance coverage.   32 
Table 2: Sample Means and Standard Deviations in Patient-level Data Set  
 
(n = 2,258,674) 
                Standard 
            Mean    Deviation 
 
Age            26.9      6.23 
Race/ethnicity 
   - White          0.556      0.497 
   - Black          0.211      0.408 
   - Hispanic          0.171      0.376 
  - Other race          0.062      0.241 
 
Health insurance 
   - PPO and indemnity        0.271      0.445 
- HMO          0.230      0.421 
- Other private insurance      0.025      0.157 
- Medicaid          0.396      0.489 
- Uninsured          0.078      0.269 
 
Woman’s health condition: 
  Woman has had a previous c-section    0.129      0.335 
  Malpositioned fetus        0.061      0.239 
  Antepartum bleeding        0.018      0.131 
  Severe hypertension        0.011      0.105 
  Preterm gestation        0.071      0.257 
  Multiple gestation        0.010      0.100 
  Maternal soft tissue disorder      0.022      0.146 
  Macrosomia           0.029      0.167     
  Oligohydramnios         0.006      0.074     
  Polyhydramnios        0.022      0.145     
  Herpes          0.014      0.119 
  Uterine scar unrelated to prior c-section  0.002      0.039 
  Uterine rupture        0.001      0.028 
  Unengaged fetal head        0.011      0.0064 
  Congenital fetal CNS anomaly     0.001      0.031 
  Cerebral hemorrhage         0.0001      0.007 
  Diabetes          0.008      0.091 
  Chorioamnionitis        0.022      0.146 
  Ruptured membrane > 24 hours    0.013      0.113 
  Maternal hypotension        0.001      0.034 
  Intrauterine growth restriction      0.015      0.123 
  Maternal heart disease       0.012      0.107 
  Asthma           0.012      0.109 
  Maternal renal abnormality      0.001      0.034 
  Other maternal infection      0.013      0.113 
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Table 3: Selected Coefficient Estimates From a Patient-level Cross-Section Regression, 2003 
 
                  Standard 
          Coefficient      Error 
Age            -0.0076**    0.0010 
Age squared           0.00017**    0.00002 
Black             0.0022     0.0023 
Hispanic           0.0067**    0.0024 
Health insurance (PPO and indemnity omitted) 
-  HMO          -0.0006     0.0024 
-  Medicaid         -0.020**    0.0024     
-  Other private insurance      -0.0088     0.0057 
-  Uninsured        -0.043**    0.0038 
Health of mother or baby: 
  Woman has had a previous c-section     0.67**     0.0023   
  Malpositioned fetus         0.47**     0.0032     
  Antepartum bleeding         0.32**     0.0058     
  Severe hypertension         0.21**     0.0075     
  Preterm gestation        -0.0029     0.0032     
  Multiple gestation         0.21**     0.0078     
  Maternal soft tissue disorder       0.17**     0.0046     
  Macrosomia            0.33**     0.0044     
  Oligohydramnios          0.13**     0.0093     
  Polyhydramnios         0.14**     0.0050     
  Herpes           0.18**     0.0058 
  Uterine scar           0.44**     0.015 
  Uterine rupture         0.16**     0.040 
  Unengaged fetal head         0.68**     0.0064 
  Congenital fetal CNS anomaly      0.13**     0.023 
  Cerebral hemorrhage          0.24*      0.14 
  Diabetes           0.066**    0.0067 
  Chorioamnionitis         0.22**     0.0063 
  Ruptured membrane > 24 hours     0.045**    0.0074 
  Maternal hypotension         0.071**    0.022 
  Intrauterine growth restriction       0.10**     0.0061 
  Maternal heart disease        0.030**    0.0066 
  Asthma            0.034**    0.0058 
  Maternal renal abnormality       0.037**    0.019 
  Other maternal infection       0.074**    0.0066 
 
Observations               202,022 
R
2                    0.63 
Mean of dependent variable              0.33 
 
Notes:  Dependent variable is an indicator for whether a woman received a c-section.  We include 
a full set of physician indicator variables in the above regression and omit the constant.  We also 
include indicators for whether a patient’s race is missing, whether her age is missing, and various 
other health measures.  Indicators are included for eight other health conditions (e.g., thyroid 
abnormality).  ** = significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level; * = significantly 
different from zero at the 10-percent level.   34 
Table 4: Sample Means and Standard Deviations in Physician-level Data Set 
 
                Standard 
            Mean    Deviation 
Physician characteristics: 
Female           0.143    0.350 
Gender information missing      0.094    0.292 
Non-white          0.088    0.283 
Race information missing      0.692    0.462 
Post-residency experience (years)    13.4    7.68 
Specialty 
   - ob/gyn          0.851    0.364 
   - family practice/internal medicine    0.004    0.063 
- maternal and fetal medicine      0.021    0.143 
- information missing       0.119    0.324 
 
Physician’s practice characteristics: 
Number of deliveries        191    125 
Unadjusted c-section rate      0.263    0.093 
Risk adjusted c-section rate      0.143    0.078 
Unadjusted elective c-section rate    0.150    0.077 
Risk-adjusted elective c-section rate    0.047    0.051 
Unadjusted c-section rate | labor     0.134    0.059 
Risk-adjusted c-section rate | labor    0.121    0.064 
 
Local peer group’s practice characteristics: 
Risk-adjusted c-section rate      0.143    0.109 
Risk-adjusted elective c-section rate    0.054    0.049 
Risk-adjusted c-section rate | labor    0.120    0.088 
 
Regional peer group’s practice characteristics: 
Risk-adjusted c-section rate      0.140    0.053 
Risk-adjusted elective c-section rate    0.052    0.026 
Risk-adjusted c-section rate | labor     0.119    0.042 
 
n = 7,004 physician-years 
 
 
Note: There are 848 physicians in the panel data set.  A physician’s risk adjusted c-section rate is 
the coefficient on a physician indictor in a cross-section ordinary least squares regression where 
the unit of observation is a delivery and dependent variable is one if a woman received a c-
section, and zero otherwise.  A physician’s risk-adjusted elective c-section rate and c-section rate 
conditional on labor are likewise coefficients on physician indicator variables where the 
dependent variable is one if a woman received an elective c-section and one if she received a c-
section conditional upon going into labor, respectively.   32 





      All Physicians                Physicians With Fewer Than 4 Years Experience 
   (n = 7,004)                    (n = 510) 
 
              Elective       C-section rate |        Elective      C-section rate | 
              C-section rate      c-section rate   labor          C-section rate      c-section rate   labor 
 
Year indicators       0.300    0.217    0.301      0.170    0.157    0.165 
 
Regional indicators      0.056    0.029    0.058      0.059    0.029    0.064 
 
Physician characteristics: gender  0.024    0.024    0.016      0.058    0.090    0.034 
   race, experience, and specialty 
 
Residency program indicators    0.004    0.005    0.004      0.039    0.018    0.037 
 
Variation common to the above   0.039    0.049    0.025      0.046    0.017    0.115 
   variables 
 
Physician indicators      0.348    0.360    0.307      0.447    0.488    0.375 
 
Total variation explained    0.771    0.684    0.711      0.819    0.799    0.790 
 
 
Notes:  Observations are physician-year practice style measures, pooled from 1992 to 2003.  There are 848 unique physicians in the data set, of 
whom 200 had fewer than four years of experience at some point.  The practice style measures are adjusted for observed patient characteristics 
such as patient’s age and health.  The incremental R
2 for the physician indicators is the difference between the R
2 when physician and year 
indicators are included in the regression and the R
2 when the physician indicators are omitted but all other variables are included.  Indicators were 
included for the 15 residency programs in which five or more physicians received their obstetrical/gynecology residency training.    33 
Table 6: Fixed Effect Coefficient Estimates of a Physician’s Risk-Adjusted C-section Rate 
 
           (1)        (2)       (3)       (4) 
 
Regional peer group’s     0.14**    0.11**    0.0061    0.12** 
   c-section rate, t    (0.025)   (0.026)   (0.031)   (0.034) 
Regional peer group’s              0.10**    
   c-section rate, t-1            (0.031)      
Regional peer group’s rate in               -0.0015 
   year t * MD’s experience              (0.0016) 
       
Local peer group’s         0.046**   0.044**   0.079**     
   c-section rate, t        (0.0069)  (0.0081)  (0.016) 
Local peer group’s              0.0064    
   c-section rate, t-1            (0.0083)     
Local peer group’s rate in               -0.0025** 
   year t * MD’s experience              (0.0010) 
       
Constant       0.13**    0.12**    0.11**    0.12** 
        (0.0039)  (0.0039)  (0.0053)  (0.0039) 
 
Year indicators:       YES      YES      YES      YES 
Observations        7004      7004      6137      7004 
R
2          0.33      0.34      0.37      0.33 
Mean of dependent variable    0.143      0.143      0.142      0.143 
 
Notes:  The dependent variable is a physician’s risk-adjusted c-section rate in year t.  ** = significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level.  
* = significantly different from zero at the 10-percent level.  There are 848 unique physicians in the panel data set.   34 
Table 7: Fixed Effect Coefficient Estimates of a Physician’s Risk-Adjusted Elective C-section Rate  
 
             (1)       (2)        (3)       (4) 
 
Regional peer group’s     0.27**    0.21**    0.054     0.22** 
   elective c-section rate, t  (0.038)   (0.039)   (0.048)   (0.057) 
Regional peer group’s              0.16**    
   elective c-section rate, t-1          (0.051)      
Regional peer group’s rate in                0.0002 
   year t * MD’s experience              (0.003) 
       
Local peer group’s elective       0.12**    0.10**    0.14**    
   c-section rate, t        (0.012)   (0.014)   (0.029) 
Local peer group’s elective           0.037*    
   c-section rate, t-1            (0.014)    
Local peer group’s rate in               -0.0017 
   year t * MD’s experience              (0.0017) 
       
Constant       0.011**   0.0086**  -0.0011    0.0082** 
        (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0022)  (0.0018) 
 
Year indicators:       YES      YES      YES      YES 
Observations        7004      7004      6137      7004 
R
2          0.25      0.28      0.31      0.28 
Mean of dependent variable    0.047      0.047      0.049      0.047 
 
Notes:  The dependent variable is a physician’s risk-adjusted elective c-section rate in year t.  ** = significantly different from zero at the 5-
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Table 9: First-Difference Coefficient Estimates 
 
          Overall     Elective    C-section | 
               C-section rate           C-section rate    labor rate 
       
Change in regional peer     -0.021      -0.0070     -0.031   
   group’s rate, t-1 to t      (0.032)     (0.051)     (0.037)    
 
Change in regional peer       0.060*      0.052       0.058     
   group’s rate, t-2 to t-1     (0.035)     (0.060)     (0.038)  
 
Change in local peer       0.041**     0.087**     0.036**     
   group’s rate, t-1 to t      (0.0088)    (0.014)     (0.011) 
 
Change in local peer       -0.0015      0.021       0.0025 
   group’s rate, t-2 to t-1     (0.0078)    (0.015)     (0.0094) 
       
Constant        -0.019**     0.012**    -0.028**      
          (0.0023)    (0.0014)    (0.0024) 
 
Observations         5343        5343        5343 
R
2            0.27         0.20         0.31 
Mean of dependent variable        0.010           0.0075      0.0049 
 
Notes:  Dependent variable is the change in a physician’s practice style between year t-1 and t.  The practice style measures are adjusted for 
observed patient characteristics such as patient’s age and health. The regressions are weighted by the reciprocal of the standard error of a 
physician’s practice style measure from the first-stage, cross-sectional regression.  Indicator variables are included for years.  There are 848 unique 
physicians in the panel data set.  ** = significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level; * = significantly different from zero at the 10-percent 
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Figure 1
Percentage of C-section Deliveries in Florida by Type, 1992-2003
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Within-Region Variation in Physician Practice Styles, 1992-2003 
 
Figure 2a          Figure 2b          Figure 2c 
 
Risk-adjusted c-section rates      Risk-adjusted scheduled       Risk-adjusted c-section rates 
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Standard:      6.0 percentage points          4.3 percentage points           4.9 percentage points 
Deviation 
 
Note: an observation is the deviation between a physician’s practice style and the regional average for a particular year.  There are 848 physicians 
and 7,004 physician-years in the above figures.  Physician practice styles are risk-adjusted based on patients’ observed characteristics. 
 